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ESSAYS

THE COMPLEXITIES OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
A NEW WORLD ORDER CHALLENGE
Richard Falk*
I. FRAMING AN INQUIRY

The interplay between juridical support for norms of non-intervention and the actualities of interventionary diplomacy is an integral
feature of a world of sovereign, yet unequal, states pursuing diverse
goals. Pointing in one direction is the juridical stress on sovereignty,
reinforced by spatial notions of territorial supremacy within fixed
boundaries, which provides the doctrinal underpinnings of non-interventionism. Pointing in the other direction is the effort to project power and
influence beyond territorial sovereignty, virtually a definition of what
distinguishes a great power from an ordinary state, which creates the
geopolitical pressures that result in intervention in the internal and
external affairs of weaker sovereign states. This essay assesses the
nature of change in interventionary diplomacy since the end of the Cold
War against this conceptual background.
Part of the complexity traditionally associated with interventionary
diplomacy is its confounding and varying admixtures of politics, morality, and law. These admixtures exist irrespective of whether the particular
intervention is characterized as "humanitarian" - although by so describing an intervention, the moral/legal justification is given additional
importance.
The political dimension is preoccupied with the decisive issues of
effectiveness and acceptability: managing the means/end relationship
between commitment and outcome, and assessing the acceptability of
the interventionary claim in various arenas of decisionmaking and
evaluation. This dimension is also crucial in determining whether the
overall interest of the intervening state - including its reputation for
effective and legitimate action - is promoted through the effort to
influence behavior by coercive means in a foreign country and whether

* Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University.
J.S.D., Harvard University (1962); LL.B., Yale Law School (1955); B.S., University of
Pennsylvania (1952).
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sufficient resources can and should be brought to bear to achieve the
interventionary goals within a reasonable amount of time given the level
of prevailing domestic support.
The moral dimension of interventionary diplomacy focuses on
vindicating the claim that the use of force is essential and proportionate:
that it benefits the peoples of the target society, serves the values (and
interests) of the intervening state, and contributes to the global common
good.'
The legal dimension is concerned with invoking and establishing
precedents and making legal arguments about rules and standards in
support of, or in opposition to, a particular interventionary undertaking.
The subject-matter of intervention evolved as an incident of the
Westphalian world order. States were the only legitimate actors enjoying
the rights of territorial supremacy and there existed no external legal
constraints on government decisions to use force as an instrument of
statecraft. While it is still true that only states possess the military
capabilities and political disposition needed to fashion the sort of policy
that is likely to be identified as "interventionary," recent practice over
the last half-century in interventionary diplomacy has exhibited the
impact of several new elements. 3
The most significant new element impinging on interventionary
diplomacy, is the role played by the United Nations and regional entities, especially in Europe. Nevertheless, the character of the United
Nations' role is ambiguous both overall and from case to case. Particularly confusing is the uncertainty regarding whether a Security Council
decision involves a genuinely collective and community interventionary

1. These perspectives may not point in the same direction. For instance, the 1986 United
States air strike against Libya in alleged retaliation for Libya's complicity in terrorist actions

against U.S. targets was and remains inconclusive from these viewpoints. It was not certain
that Libya was involved in the specific terrorist incident that served as the factual basis for
the interventionary claim. Neither was it clear that the targets chosen were appropriate or that

the means used were proportionate. Yet the attack did not arouse any strong adverse reaction,
partly because Libya had previously and blatantly acted in a provocative manner with respect
to international terrorism and partly because the United States' use of limited force was

widely, but not uniformly, accepted as a reasonable way to compel Libya to change its
behavior (which seems to have happened in the period subsequent to the attack). For a series

of skeptical assessments of the American claim, see MAD DOGS: THE U.S. RAIDS ON L1YA
(Mary Kaldor & Paul Anderson eds., 1986).
2. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD

PUBLIC ORDER (1961) (on the process by which claims to use force are validated in international law).
3. Russia, although no longer the global presence of the Soviet Union at the height of the
Cold War, remains, since 1989, an uncontested interventionary actor in the "near abroad," the
region comprised of those formally independent states that had previously been republics in
the Soviet imperial system.
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judgment guided predominantly by considerations of public good.
Uncertainty clouds the degree to which such a decision is little more
than a legitimating rationale for use of force that would otherwise be
more widely viewed as "illegal" if undertaken by a state on its own or
in coalition with other states. Another relatively new element is the
emergence and magnitude of an array of transnational civil initiatives
that seek to mitigate the suffering of people living in the target societies
and participating in any warfare that results. The International Committee of the Red Cross, established in reaction to the horrific battlefield
conditions of the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, is suggestive of this non-governmental role that has been expanding in
interventionary contexts, especially those expressly characterized as
humanitarian. Also relatively novel are legal constraints on the use of
force as an instrument of statecraft and formal prohibitions on all forms
of coercion that possess an interventionary character. 4 A final development is the emergence of a highly articulated international law of human
rights, reinforced psychologically by ideas about government and individual accountability for their gross violation. Cumulatively, heightened
expectations about conformity to minimal human rights standards generate interventionary pressures, especially given the capacity of television
and other innovative media to create real-time awareness of many types
of inhumane behavior on a global basis.
Evaluating the effect of these normative innovations in the status of
force remains controversial: are we dealing mainly with a change in
discursive reality - such that what has really changed is language, not
behavior - with major states still retaining, on a behavioral level, a
discretionary option to use force? A middle position contends that the
discursive change alters behavior by legitimating challenges directed at
uses of force that did not previously exist. Gradually, there are moves
away from reliance on force, thereby affecting in subtle ways the balance of considerations entering into the national security calculus of
governments.

4. There is a long list of familiar legal authorities starting with the Pact of Paris (also
known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact). Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. The basic

contemporary rule of prohibition is contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The prohibition of intervention by states builds on this fundamental rule. See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., Agenda Item
107, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (1966). These fundamental ideas are integrated in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.

GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Agenda Item 85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970).
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The increased complexity of the phenomenon of intervention has
had a number of contradictory effects. It has become more difficult to
identify who is responsible for what. While the state continues to dominate interventionary diplomacy, it often operates indirectly, by reliance
on the authorizing mandate of one or more layer of institutional authority at the regional and global levels.5 Such indirectness of mandate
dilutes and disguises the role of the state to some extent, undercuts
somewhat certain anti-interventionary criticism, and shifts part of the
responsibility for failure to achieve interventionary goals to the wider
institutional frameworks, especially that of the United Nations. Further,
norms of non-intervention in addition to prohibitions on the use of force
are somewhat at odds with the contemporary view that the occasion of
human rights abuse provides legal and moral grounds for disregarding
the sovereign rights of states.6
Given this complexity, it is hardly surprising that the subject-matter
of interventionary diplomacy has consistently given rise to controversy
and inconclusive results. This effect has been more pervasive in constitutional democracies that claim a moral advantage and legal validation
for their foreign policy initiatives, at least partly, because of the domestic accountability of their political leaders through free and periodic
elections and legislative checks. 7 Discussing the reluctance of the Bush
Administration to get involved on the ground during the early stages of
the war in Bosnia, then-Secretary of State James Baker recalled a few
years later that "the American people would not have stood for such a
commitment for even three days!"' Such a perception of citizen skepticism about an interventionary policy operates as a definite check on a
proposed intervention that is not clearly based on widely acknowledged
strategic interests or national security considerations. When such lines of
justification are powerfully present, then the passions of the electorate
can act, on occasion, as a spur to intervene.

5. This reliance has caused rather meaningless debates as to whether the United Nations

has "failed" because of the dismal outcomes in several recent peacekeeping tasks or whether
the United Nations has been made a scapegoat by leading member states. See DAVID RIEFF,
SLAUGHTERHOUSE: BOSNIA AND THE FAILURE OF THE WEST 13-23 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct:
Codifying HumanitarianIntervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1992).

7. This is not to say that the moral/legal status of an intervention is the primary ingredient of its acceptability; generally, far more relevant is the sense of interests at stake in relation
to prospects for success at acceptable costs. As suggested by the experience in the Gulf War,
the level of domestic support rose dramatically when a quick and easy victory resulted.
Conversely, the early popularity of the Korean and Vietnam Wars dropped as the costs rose,
the war dragged on, and the prospects for victory diminished.
8. Observation made during an informal meeting with the faculty of the Woodrow
Wilson School, Princeton University, April 1994.
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The United States seems especially susceptible to such swings of
interventionary mood that can be played upon by opportunistic politicians. Such a possibility is reinforced by the American political myth of
acting benevolently, rather than selfishly, on international issues, and of
being a country whose actions are allegedly driven by values rather than
interests. This special American need for a moral justification stems, no
doubt, in part, from its own anti-colonial heritage, its recent championship of international human rights including the right of self-determination, and its tendency to disguise its selfish motivations for overseas
actions. 9 This complex orientation of the United States toward intervention, inhibited by the Vietnam syndrome and encouraged by a missionary mentality, is of great world order significance at the present time because of the leadership role it has played as the sole remaining superpower.
Accompanying the changes in interventionary diplomacy has been a
further stage-setting factor: the demise of the credibility of geopolitical
pressures to intervene since the end of the Cold War.'" This development reinforces the normative impact of the collapse of colonialism and
the participation in global politics of leaders of ex-colonies who remain
generally suspicious of any interventionary claim. To circumvent such
resistance within the setting of the United Nations, interventionary arguments have been formulated in a manner that effectively obscures great
power aspects. The rise of "humanitarian" rationalizations is an effort to
reconcile the proactive impulse to intervene with the normative inhibitions on the use of force for geopolitical purposes given the present
historical setting.
There is a further general observation. To the extent that intervention (aside from countries intervening in the affairs of their neighbors) is
the exclusive work of great powers, its feasibility as a policy option is
often shaped by the nature of the governing structure within the intervening state. If the state is authoritarian, it needs generally less public

9. Two contradictory lines of interpretation are significant. One regards the United States

as a self-maximizing intervening power with little sense of moral scruple. For a powerful
articulation of this view, see GABRIEL KOLKO, CENTURY OF WAR 412-51 (1994). The other
sees the United States as unwilling to act coercively in foreign policy until it is first convinced of the moral correctness of its position. An influential formulation of this view is to be
found in HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994).

10. Geopolitical factors remain relevant in some settings. Islamic challenges in key
Middle East countries may still create a new geopolitical climate favorable to intervention
should the pro-Western orientation of the governments in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt be
seriously threatened. It is not difficult to imagine a number of scenarios involving a resurgent
and assertive Russia, possibly aligned with China, that would raise further the geopolitical

stakes in the outcome of various internal struggles for power.
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support at home and is consequently less interested in mounting an
elaborate justification, beyond deflecting international reactions and
positing its security concerns. Such a state can also reverse its course
more readily since it has not mobilized its citizenry in such a way as to
be entrapped by their expectations. If the state is democratic, however, it
must persuade its citizenry of the merits of an interventionary policy,
especially if resistance is expected in the target society, casualties are
anticipated as a distinct possibility, and there is no assurance of a rapid
end to hostilities. Once persuaded, however, the termination of an
intervention may be politically problematic as it could involve an acknowledgment of failure that has cost the lives of citizens. The United
States has assumed much of the interventionary leadership both during
the Cold War and since its conclusion, and has a particular need to rest
its policy on a firm platform of public acceptance - a position that was
greatly solidified during the definitive interventionary experience of this
era, namely the Vietnam War.
Historical memory is also of crucial relevance, as is its most authoritative construction. It is common knowledge how governmental attitudes
toward national security policy and resultant international behavior in
the West were shaped after 1945 by "the lessons of Munich," and
associated fears about "appeasement" and lack of military preparedness.
Leaders and populations were educated about the importance of confronting early expressions of aggressive behavior, even in marginal
settings, to avoid later having to deal with a more focused challenge to
the established world order. Such a process of social learning was
reinforced by America's lost innocence at Pearl Harbor. This realization
of vulnerability to surprise attack by distant enemies was further reinforced by revolutionary technological developments associated with the
means of waging war, above all by nuclear weaponry, but also by
missiles, guidance and reconnaissance systems, as well as the advent of
sophisticated submarines and long-range bomber aircraft.
Twenty-five years later, the Vietnam syndrome imparted a quite
different message. Syllabi for social learning were updated to recognize
that it is not worth the effort to address challenges in marginal arenas
when the consequence is military frustration, serious division and demoralization in the core country and its allies, as well as magnified
suffering and devastation in the target society. Since the Vietnam War,
literally every American political leader, regardless of party or ideological orientation, has attempted to rally public support for recourse to
military action in a manner that would erase the Vietnam syndrome
from public consciousness once and for all, thereby removing one
source of reluctance to use force in pursuit of national interests. In
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contrast, those opposed to interventionary diplomacy, especially those
who felt harmed or betrayed by the Vietnam War have continued to
regard the Vietnam syndrome as a useful cautionary inhibition upon
interventionary impulses.
Such a preliminary assessment of interventionary diplomacy is
lacking in historical specificity. Although interventionism has been a
pervasive feature of international relations, its specific forms have varied
with the times, and need to be so understood by reference to the global
setting.
Interventionary diplomacy during the Cold War reflected the bipolar
character of geopolitics and induced patterns of intervention that were
based primarily on maintaining or disrupting ideological affiliations,
especially in countries where geopolitical affinities were ambiguous and
contested, and the risks of escalation seemed manageable." It is revealing that the most globally dangerous instances of intervention occurred
in relation to countries divided along ideological lines (Vietnam, Korea,
China, and Germany) or in countries situated geographically close to
one or the other superpower (Afghanistan and Cuba). Since 1989,
however, the geopolitical pressures to intervene have weakened in most
settings, while humanitarian pressures to intervene have strengthened.
Fundamentally, geopolitical and humanitarian pressures to intervene
are of a radically different character. Both types of intervention have
proved problematic given current realities about the military, economic,
and political capabilities needed for an effective intervention and the
extent and character of support and political will required to sustain an
interventionary effort until its goals are reached. The failure of
geopolitical intervention is associated mainly with its inability to overcome indigenous nationalist forces of resistance, particularly when
reinforced diplomatically and militarily by counter-interventionary
capabilities. The failure of humanitarian intervention, however, arises
mainly because of the relatively shallow commitment on the intervening
side, thereby simplifying the tactics of resistance even in the absence of
12
counter-interventionary support.

11. In essence, interventionary rivalry between the superpowers was encouraged on the
periphery while avoided at the core; serious confrontations occurred in Vietnam, Korea, and
Afghanistan, but not in Eastern Europe or Central America. The tense moments occurred in
circumstances of uncertainty as in the Cuban Missile Crisis or with respect to access to
Berlin. Governing elites in Moscow and Washington learned that testing the will of their
adversary in such settings was dangerous and should be avoided.
12. To the extent that the intervention is genuinely humanitarian, in its essence, it tends
to be "shallow." Shallow here means that it arises from an assessment that the mission can be
completed successfully on the basis of a modest commitment of resources and without
incurring serious risks of substantial loss of lives on the part of the intervening side. In
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Closely related to this shift in the justifying discourse, is an apparent
change in political backing. The geopolitically oriented interventions
represent the outgrowth of an assessment of strategic interests by government leaders who then mobilize public support for an interventionary
policy. In contradistinction, humanitarian interventions result from
societal pressures, recently enhanced by a more globalized media, that
finally compel a reluctant political leadership to act against its sense of
the national interest, but to limit its commitments to the extent possible
politically. Recent trends toward transferring formal responsibility to the
United Nations can be seen as a mechanism to defuse societal pressures
to act while avoiding an open-ended interventionary commitment.
Because interventionary diplomacy, especially if lacking strong
geopolitical motives and sufficient capabilities, is likely to fail, the
reputation of the United Nations in the field of peace and security has
declined, temporarily at least. Much of this decline has been related to
the perceived failures of the United Nations to respond to humanitarian
emergencies in such countries as Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and most
of all, Bosnia. This failure has been reinforced by the transfer of primary responsibility from the United Nations to NATO. This transfer is
itself a complex, multi-faceted process, and can be viewed as one aspect
of an approach adopted to induce the parties to agree finally, if precariously, upon a peace plan. The contrast between NATO's willingness to
engage Serb resistance militarily, and the United Nations' reluctance to

contrast, an intervention that proceeds from a geopolitical rationale, even if it includes
humanitarian aspects, tends to be much more open-ended with respect to the depth and
breadth of the commitment. Geopolitical commitments that were characteristic of the Cold
War era, exemplified by the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, involved massive interventions, but engendered intense nationalist forms of indigenous resistance reinforced by strong
counter-interventionary responses by the superpower opposed to the success of intervention.
Another learning experience from the Cold War was that it was more hazardous to
attempt a political restructuring of the target country than merely to pursue some particular
objective involving a change of policy. The Gulf War is illustrative of a geopolitical intervention with humanitarian aspects. The United Nations provided the backing for the main
interventionary claim, there was no prospect of significant counter-intervention, and the
intervening side did not attempt the more ambitious task of political restructuring, and indeed,
left Saddam Hussein as head of state despite demonizing him as the most abusive political
leader since Hitler. What is relevant here is that the humanitarian aspect of the intervention
was easily abandoned (that is, liberating the Iraqi people from an abusive leader and protecting the vulnerable Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the Shi'a population in southern
Iraq), especially as geopolitical calculations shifted once Iraq was removed from Kuwait and
destroyed as a regional military threat. It was perceived that the main geopolitical priority was
to keep Iraq united in order to contain Iran regarded as the other threat to Western interests in
the region and to avoid an independent Kurdish state from further destabilizing Turkey. And,
in fact, the aftermath of the Gulf War has had mainly perverse humanitarian effects as the
maintenance of economic sanctions for several years has resulted in continuing casualties and
hardships for the civilian population without seeming to weaken Saddam Hussein's hold over
Iraq.
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do so, has confirmed for many a view of United Nations ineffectiveness.
Furthermore, in a crucial sense, even NATO's role was overshadowed in
the peace process by the essentially unilateral character of United States
diplomacy, epitomized by virtually locking up the leaders of Bosnia,
Croatia, and the rump Yugoslavia in a military base in Dayton, Ohio
until they finally reached an agreement. In effect, there exists now a
r~pertoireof diplomatic tools and modalities for addressing humanitarian challenges, but none among them offers any strong promise of consistent success; indeed, the peace in Bosnia continues to hang precariously in the balance.
Finally, because states continue to be guided by a rather narrow
conception of self-interest that does not extend to the well-being of
foreign societies and their peoples, their unwillingness to intervene
effectively in circumstances of great human urgency increasingly encourages independent grassroots initiatives to undertake humanitarian
missions. An outstanding example of this expanding role is Mdecins
sans Frontibres.More relevantly, the agents of humanitarian intervention are now often actors other than governments, especially transnational citizens associations, operating on a political logic that is shaped
almost exclusively by moral considerations - largely an ethos of responsibility and solidarity - that is very different from the statist outlook that guides most governments when they are engaged in humanitarian missions. Of course, such generalizations need careful qualification.
For instance, there are a series of governments of middle size, most
notably those of the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the Netherlands, that act in a more genuine humanitarian spirit, and subordinate
their statist character to an identity shaped by the humanitarian imperative. At the same time, the capabilities and outlook of these transnational forces should not be romanticized. Some of these transnational actors
are funded and otherwise dependent on one or more governments, and
thus lack real independence. Also, if conflicts cross the threshold of
large-scale violence, non-governmental actors generally lack the financial, diplomatic, and logistical means to address directly the core of the
conflict or even to gain access to the participants.
The foregoing discussion supports the conclusion that the present
status of interventionary initiatives is shaped by several realities:
*

intervention in almost any foreign society is likely to entail
important risks of failure for the intervening side;
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*

geopolitical factors may persuade leaders to take such risks,
but humanitarian concerns are unlikely to do so even if backed
up by strong political pressures; 3
* defusing political pressures to alleviate human suffering
without adopting a major interventionary commitment has
encouraged reliance upon the United Nations;
" disillusionment with this pattern is likely to produce, at least
temporarily, a reduced role for the United Nations, and greater
reliance on regional actors, dominant states, and instances of
an outright refusal to act;
" humanitarian concerns have also been stimulating significant
transnational initiatives of a non-governmental character;
• the combination of media attention and the evolution of a
human rights culture provide a coherent rationale for
"humanitarian intervention" (that is, serious expectations that
severe abuses of human rights, including acute economic and
cultural deprivations, are matters of international concern that
justify interventionary action and overcome otherwise
restraining considerations associated with non-intervention
commitments and attitudes); and
• this combination of developments in the last several years,
especially in light of the human ordeal that has accompanied
the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, has caused profound
disillusionment with the capacity of the collective will in
international society to protect vulnerable peoples against
severe forms of abuse and suffering arising either from
governmental aggression (Bosnia, Chechnya, East Timor,
Tibet), acute ethnic strife (Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi), or from
governmental collapse (Somalia).
The questions raised by these realities are wide ranging. What
should we learn from this dismal experience? How shall the interplay
between interventionary diplomacy and international law be interpreted
in light of both doctrinal formulations and the practice of states, international organizations, and transnational citizens associations? What is the
legal standing of various claims of humanitarian intervention by different types of actors? How can the role of international law be strengthened without raising expectations too high? How can the constraining

13. The Gulf War discloses the relative priority of these two classes of concerns,
providing an illustration of a massive geopolitical response and a minimal humanitarian
response. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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impact of geopolitics be acknowledged without undermining the relevance of international law?
II.

CONCEPTUAL AMBIGUITIES

Intervention is notoriously ambiguous as a legal term of art. It is
used journalistically to describe all forms of influence projected primarily by governments of states (but more recently by other political actors,
as well) in their interaction with one another. In general coinage, the
term intervention has been reserved for situations in which a powerful
state uses forcible means, characteristically including the use of military
capabilities, to alter the policies or governing structures of weaker states.
In geopolitical terms, intervention has been used to maintain traditional
spheres of influence within the region of a powerful state, and more
widely during the Cold War when the entire Third World became an
arena for competitive interventionary diplomacy between the two superpowers.' 4 The United States has frequently "intervened" over the course
of many decades in the Caribbean and Central America to uphold its
traditional control within this neighboring region - an interventionary
pattern early formulated as a precept of foreign policy (The Monroe
Doctrine). Nevertheless, the United States' interventionary character was
somewhat disguised in each particular instance by lofty claims of protecting democracy and rescuing the people of a target society from an
abusive government, and by invoking rather flimsy contentions of
regional authorization. In the last several years, interventions in Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti have all been justified in such humanitarian terms with varying degrees of credibility.
But are each of these instances properly regarded as interventions'
from the perspective of international law? When a government gives its
clear and uncoerced consent to the initiative of another country it removes a large part of the interventionary taint. Of course, ambiguities
surround the authority to invite intervention and the genuineness of the
invitation. Most recently, it is contended that when the people of the
target country seek protection from their own government, their approval of interventionary action is equivalent to consent, and has the effect
of removing, or at least qualifying, the interventionary taint.15 Also, as

14. Regional politics is quite distinct, in many instances, from global geopolitics. Egypt's
intervention in Yemen, Iran's intervention in Dhofar, and India's intervention in Bhutan and
Sikkim were connected mainly with hegemonic ambitions of regional scope.
15. For influential formulations along these lines see Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of
Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990); W. Michael
Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4), 78 AM. J.INT'L L. 642
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in Haiti, the essentially unilateral move made by the United States to
restore the elected government to power was undertaken with the blessing and collaboration of the United Nations Security Council after
sustained brutality by a military regime that had usurped power from the
elected civilian leadership. 16 Given the opinion of the International Court
of Justice in the Lockerbie case 17 that there is no review of Security
Council action taken within the formal scope of its authority, it would
seem that any initiatives endorsed by the Security Council are effectively immunized from interventionary accusations of a legal character, at
least as mounted within the United Nations.' 8 Even the manifestly
unilateral intervention by the United States in Grenada in 1983 was
allegedly regionalized by reliance on the mandate of a previously unknown political actor, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. In a
sense, such reliance on multilateral authorization is both an acknowledgment of respect for prohibitions on unilateral intervention and a dubious
manipulation of this prohibition through the use of a multilateralizing
figleaf. When the Soviet Union relied on similar tactics to mask its
unilateralism in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, the interventionary
pretexts of "invitation" or Warsaw Pact authorization were dismissed in
the West as crude deceptions unworthy of rebuttal.
What, then, should be deemed to be intervention from the perspective of international law? Consent can be coerced or manufactured;
public approval can be claimed, or highly contingent and unreliable. It is
impossible to be too rigorous in abstract legal terms about the doctrinal
contours of interventionary practice. Whenever an external agency acts
coercively to alter the governing structure or orientation of a sovereign
state, an interference with sovereign rights occurs, such that a challenge

(1984); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in International Law, 84 AM. J.

INT'L L. 866 (1990); but compare the strong opposing argument of Sarah A. Rumage,
Panama and the Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in U.S. Foreign Policy: Neither Legal
Nor Moral, Neither Just Nor Right, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1993).
16. For analysis see Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order
Precedent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 341 (1995).
17. See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971

Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992
I.C.J. 114 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 14), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 665 (1992).
18. Obviously, it is still possible to challenge the legality of United Nations sponsored

initiatives by reference to the constraining principle of "domestic jurisdiction" embodied in
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, but what seems unlikely is that such challenges can be

successfully mounted before the International Court of Justice, given its current reluctance to
review judicially the acts of the Security Council. The Court is not bound by its own precedents, and so would technically be capable of taking a different approach to contested
Security Council action in the future. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE art. 59.
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of some sort is directed at unconditional non-intervention norms. But if
the governing process has collapsed or is widely perceived as engaged
in massive and gross violations of human rights amounting to "crimes
against humanity," especially if there is a genocidal element present,
then the moral and legal requirements for intervention are surely satisfied. This is clear especially if humanitarian concerns are not intertwined
with economic and strategic interests as would be the case if the target
country was an important oil supplier, site of foreign investment or
military base, or located in a geographically strategic place. A wellfounded humanitarian claim to act can be explained either as an exception to the prohibition on non-intervention or a suspension of such a
prohibition in light of the illegitimacy of the territorial government or,
alternatively, the existence of anarchic conditions of brutality and chaos.
Let us consider, then, situations in which there is widespread acceptance among governments and the public that the proclaimed goal of
coercive action is to alleviate suffering of the people in the target society that arises from either the breakdown of government (the so-called
"failed state" problem) or by policies being pursued by governments that
violate fundamental human rights of part or all of the society. In such
settings, we speak generally and appropriately about "humanitarian
intervention." Actually, because of the interventionary taint, especially in
the ex-colonial regions, other less evocative terms of art are generally
relied upon by the supporters of coercive initiatives, such as "humanitarian assistance," "humanitarian operation," and "humanitarian diplomacy." Problems of this sort cannot be dealt with properly by semantic
evasion. The essence of these projects still is crossing international borders and acting within a country, allegedly to help people in a condition
of acute distress. It is interventionary in this fundamental sense, and for
this reason, the terminology of humanitarian intervention remains with
us. Of course, underpinning the political language relied upon by participants in the discussion of policy responses to humanitarian emergencies
of various sorts exist controversies that arise from different factual
assessments and different perceptions regarding the mix of motives
attributed to the intervening actors. As already mentioned, the range of
actors participating in such an undertaking includes humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, international institutions, as well as states.
The range of possible motives is at least as diverse.
III. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PREDICAMENT
Most of the international literature on intervention ignores
geopolitical pressures and constraints. This failure has several serious
consequences for our capacity to understand and act in specific situa-
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tions. Part of the neglect of geopolitics is a matter of apologetics and
9
part is a matter of wishful thinking.'
The apologetic part overlooks the extent to which interventionary
claims are exclusively mounted by powerful states that have often in the
past put forward self-serving rationalizations for their questionable uses
of force to coerce weaker countries with what appear to be anti-humanitarian net effects. A recent controversial instance would be the economic
coercion maintained by the United States against Cuba for several
decades in the form of sanctions. It is rather strange that those international law specialists who think of themselves as realists when describing the predominance of power in international society tend still to talk
as if the most powerful states in the world can be taken at face value
when they purport to act as altruistic agents of change with respect to
the assertion and implementation of humanitarian claims. 20 Neither
international relations nor practice lends much support to such a benevolent role for great powers, nor, it should be added, does the evidence
support the opposite view that geopolitically motivated action will never
confer humanitarian benefits. Conclusions either way are persuasive only
to the extent that their assessment is particularized by reference to the
characteristics and effects of particular interventionary claims. Humanitarian factors are rarely, if ever, decisive in shaping an interventionary
decision of any magnitude, although governments will often rely in
public on an essentially humanitarian rationale for intervention. Such
reliance is especially characteristic of intervention under the auspices of
the United Nations in the years since 1989. It is partly an empirical,
partly an interpretative, and partly an archival matter to assess the
genuineness of such humanitarian claims, but it does not resolve the
further concern as to whether intervention is legally permissible if
humanitarian.
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1975, presumably for security
reasons, but effectively removed a genocidal regime from power, it was
widely condemned. Vietnam was called upon to withdraw by the United
Nations despite the danger, that by so doing, it would revive the influence of the Khmer Rouge. In fact, the successor Cambodian government, installed as a result of the Vietnamese intervention, was precluded

19. This distinction owes a great deal to MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
20. Compare, for instance the realist tone of THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST
NATION (1985) with his support for an emergent norm entitling peoples to democratic forms
of governance in Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 46, 63 (1992).
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from representing Cambodia in the United Nations. The anti-Vietnam
posture was based on geopolitical calculations in the face of the extremity of humanitarian considerations: it was deemed more important, in
effect, to avoid the extension of Vietnamese influence and to placate
China (then hostile to Vietnam) than to relieve the people of Cambodia
from the grotesque burden imposed on their lives by the Khmer Rouge
regime. Such priorities may seem extreme, but they are not anomalous
when it comes to disclosing the relative impact of geopolitical and
humanitarian claims on the behavior of leading states, and through their
influence, of international institutions under their control.
There is another kind of geopolitical pressure operative in the years
since the end of the Cold War: the avoidance of intervention even in the
face of extreme humanitarian emergencies. The United States has been in
the critical role of decisive leader with respect to the clarification of
geopolitical concerns. Since its experience of encountering violent
resistance in Somalia, followed by a domestic firestorm of criticism, there
has existed a Mogadishu syndrome suggesting that humanitarian interventions that take the form of ground forces risk serious military confrontations. In reaction, the United States has scaled back drastically its willingness to act, directly or indirectly, to restore peace and normalcy to
afflicted societies except by way of applying diplomatic muscle to hasten
negotiations among adversaries as in Bosnia, the Middle East, and even
Northern Ireland.2 1 This reluctance by the United States has also expressed itself in terms of rigid limits on the duration of its commitment
even to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement that it brokered, on
an unwillingness to make open-ended financial commitments in such
settings, and by a particularly notable resistance to desperate requests for
even low-level United Nations operations to prevent the renewal of
genocidal violence in Rwanda and its further outbreak in Burundi. Thus,
in some important sense, the geopolitics of humanitarian intervention has
recently worked mainly to discourage action at the regional or global
levels premised on responses that are reflective of attitudes of collective
responsibility and compassion. It is almost paradoxical that it is this antiinterventionary geopolitical mood that has been subject to as much
critical commentary as the interventionism associated with geopolitics in
general, and American foreign policy, in particular.22

21. It also lends support to preventive efforts as in Macedonia where a symbolic military
presence under United Nations auspices has so far successfully sought to avoid any spillover
of the warfare that could spread the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.
22. See RICHARD J. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES
ROLE IN THE THIRD WORLD (1968); see also KOLKO, supra note 9.
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There is also the utopian side of the ledger in these settings, with
moralists and legalists naively urging governments to do what is right
without any feeling for the political constraints that surround such
demands. One result is frustration and bitterness that comes with the
inevitable discovery that governments will not, in general, act in a
substantive manner against their material interests. This has been the
unhappy fate of East Timor and Tibet, forcibly and brutally annexed
against the clearly expressed will of their peoples. At the same time,
agitation by transnational civil groups on such issues prevents the legitimation of oppressive arrangements that cannot be reconciled with minimal conceptions of self-determination and human rights. The basic
compromise in these settings is avoidance of substantive opposition, but
engagement in some sort of symbolic action that to varying degrees
withholds complete legitimation. Another result of utopian thinking is
terrible disappointment with the role of international law: finding it
impotent to overcome the torments of peoples, and entire nations
trapped in humanitarian emergencies. Both effects tend to divert attention from the constructive, if modest, roles of international law, as well
as from the contributions that can be made on other avenues seeking to
exert political influence.
In essence, the only way to induce action in support of such humanitarian claims is to generate enough countervailing power to overcome
geopolitical inhibitions. Domestic protest in the key countries of the
United Kingdom and the United States, succeeded in doing this with
respect to instituting a sanctions campaign to weaken apartheid during
the early 1980s, thereby providing the political context for an effective
transnational campaign that drew upon humanitarian arguments but did
not rely upon them to achieve change. In this regard, mobilized domestic and transnational pressures responsive to humanitarian emergencies
can alter the geopolitical calculus to a considerable extent, especially as
most political leaders are preoccupied with maintaining domestic power.
A famous instance, the interpretation of which is itself a matter of
continuing controversy, involved the level of United States support for
the early period of Israeli statehood - prior to 1967 after which Israel
became more of a strategic partner - despite the risk of weakening crucial ties with oil-rich Arab countries in the Middle East. Obviously, the
impact on geopolitical calculations is greatest in a democratic country
where a well-financed, deeply committed constituency imaginatively
mobilizes its resources for a sharply focused campaign. The impact is
particularly heightened where the same constituency has enough of a
perceived connection to domestic political balances to exert pressure that
will confine foreign policy within rigid parameters that make little
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geopolitical sense if considered purely by reference to international
goals. The Cuban exile community has been remarkably effective in its
efforts to maintain United States pressures on Castro's Cuba despite the
undermining, since 1989, of geopolitical pretexts for a hostile relationship.
If international law, following the broad outlines of the New Haven
approach associated with the work of Myres McDougal, Harold
Lasswell, and more recently, Michael Reisman, is to be associated with
some kind of conjointness between the authority to act and the capacity
to implement, then the application of international law to the theory and
practice of humanitarian intervention is highly problematic in the current global setting.23 Recent experience in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia,
Burundi, Chechnya, and most of all, Bosnia and Croatia, is suggestive
of both the growth of authoritative claims to act on behalf of the international community and of the absence of the capabilities to translate
those claims with any consistency into outcomes that vindicate the
undertaking. There is, thus, a serious gap between claim and performance with a tendency to deform the implementing policy and its agents
of enactment.
Important questions ensue. Does this suggest the wisdom of a higher
threshold of non-intervention despite the presence of humanitarian
wrongs that need to be corrected? Does it also underscore the importance of differentiating actions by states and inter-state actors such as
the United Nations and NATO from transnational civic initiatives that
are carried out by independent associations of citizens?
At issue, also, is the fundamental Westphalian question of representation. It has been useful and generally reliable to treat the constituted
government as the authoritative representative of the people - the
"subject" of international law. Furthermore, with reason, the manipulation of counter-elites to obtain invitations and mandates to intervene,
which was standard Soviet practice (as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
Afghanistan in 1979), reinforced the view that only the legitimate,
internationally recognized government has the authority to grant consent
for the entry of an outside force with an interventionary mission. But
this neat Westphalian view has been eroding in a variety of respects as
a result of recent practice. For one thing, if the oppressed people of a
country can validate interventionary force by welcoming their own
23. See Hedley Bull's important argument that international society lacks sufficient
solidarity at this time to support collective ventures for the public good on a global level such
as humanitarian intervention or criminal accountability of government officials. Hedley Bull,
The Grotian Conception of InternationalSociety, in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS 51 (Herbert

Butterfield & Martin Wight eds., 1966).
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liberation, then the voice of formal governmental authority can be cast
aside rather abruptly; such is the implication of an alleged emerging
right of democracy or the state-shattering practice of self-determination
accompanying the break-up of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.2 4 Also, if there has been a collapse of government, there is no
authority to grant or withhold consent, and forcible entry can be
claimed, as it has been, by reference to the objective conditions of
complex humanitarian emergency. But what if those empowered to
represent are also the perpetrators of crimes against humanity? These
leaders are simultaneously treated as negotiating partners and potential
war criminals. This is the puzzle created by the 1995 Dayton Peace
Agreement. It suggests that diplomacy should be less confined to its
traditional governmental parameters. Instead of treating only figures
such as Karadzic and Milogevi6 as negotiating partners, there should
have been discussions with "representatives" of these peoples who did
not endorse or participate in crimes of state or seek to establish states
along ethnically pure lines. The feasibility of such an alternative course
of action is uncertain at best. Government leaders, even if associated
with criminal practices, may alone possess representational capacity by
having sufficient control over the sentiments 'and capabilities of the
peoples, and it would be meaningless to deny their representational
authority. Such an acknowledgment of realities has led to the acceptance
of both the PLO and the IRA as necessary participants in their respective peace processes, but without the Bosnian overlay of potential indictment for previous anti-humanitarian activity.
Once that overlay exists, as is the case in relation to Bosnia, it poses
a fearful dilemma: the intention to prosecute those responsible for war
crimes seemingly can neither be dispensed with, nor implemented. And
this indeterminacy imperils the move from war to peace, and makes the
process appear vindictive to some, hypocritical to others. It is notable
that even with the resumption of IRA terrorism in February 1996, there
are no suggestions from responsible negotiating actors that perpetrators
be treated as "war criminals" because in this instance the British government has sought to protect the population by a substantive commitment
rather than abandon protection and offer those exposed to violence the
symbolic solace of a future war crimes tribunal."

24. This recent self-determination practice means that in situations other than decolonization peoples previously entrapped within a state have been acknowledged by the international
community as entitled to engage in struggle to establish by an act of secession their own
independent state. These developments are difficult to assess as they have also been the
occasion for establishing "ethnic states" that are violently and cruelly "cleansed."
25. Such an observation is not to be confused with an overall endorsement of the British
role; indeed, Prime Minister Major's tilt toward Unionist sentiments in Ulster for domestic
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This issue of reconciling Westphalian notions of representation and
legitimacy with post-Westphalian ideas of personal criminal accountability of agents of state power is at the very center of the difficulties
surrounding the contemporary compromise between geopolitics and
morality in the setting of "humanitarian intervention." The move to
institute war crimes proceedings in this instance of Bosnia (and more
casually, Rwanda) reflected the relative unwillingness of the great
powers to use their capabilities directly, by way of the United Nations
or NATO, to prevent ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia or genocide
in Rwanda and Bosnia between 1991 and 1994. Being unwilling to act
substantively when it counted most, the political pressures to act in some
manner acknowledging the humanitarian challenge produced a variety
of symbolic gestures, including the establishment of a war crimes tribunal at The Hague, an arms embargo, sanctions against Serbia, safe havens in Bosnia. These gestures had a range of effects, but overall, an
ambiguous, if not a perverse, impact on the underlying wrongdoing.
They shared the common feature of responding for the sake of humanitarian goals but not being committed to devoting major resources to
increase prospects that the response would be effective.
The standoff between the authority to intervene and the lack of
capabilities to do so effectively raises serious questions about support
for the purported legality (and even morality) of given instances of
humanitarian intervention. Indirectly, as well, it suggests that at this
stage of internationalsociety, the doctrine of non-intervention provides
a generally more constructive foundation for exerting the influence of
international law than does an emphasis of the sort contained in Secretary-General Boutros Ghali's oft-quoted passage in An Agenda for Peace
to the effect that sovereignty in the sense of territorial supremacy is
eroding as a principle of world order. This softening of deference to the
sovereignty of the territorial state is not a mere jurisprudential quibble.
The policy concerns here are at least four-fold, and are not altogether
internally consistent:
upholding the sovereign rights of weak states, by stripping
further the pretensions of legality away from interventionary
diplomacy of an essentially geopolitical character, as was the
case with the Panama intervention of 1989, that is, protecting

political gain in British elections may well have upset the balance within the IRA that had
earlier opted for a cease-fire combined with the prospect of all-party negotiations. On the
misuse by Britain of the political space during the cease-fire to pursue "the war" by other
means, see the insightful article by Martin Woollacott, Finding the Bone of Contention, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 17, 1996, at 22.
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states against dubious interventionary claims even if backed by
26
some humanitarian considerations;
avoiding punishing the victims and weakening tendencies
toward reconciliation, by acknowledging the inability and
unwillingness of leading states and international institutions (as
now constituted) of an inter-governmental character to intervene effectively for predominantly humanitarian purposes in
27
most circumstances of acute distress;
"

challenging the artificial line of sovereign deference that is
now drawn to give Russian intervention in Chechnya or Iraqi
intervention against the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, a
different, more internal legal and geopolitical status than Russian intervention in Georgia, or formerly, in the countries of
Eastern Europe; and

*

accepting the view that despite the unevenness of international
practice, it remains beneficial to maintain maximum and flexible support for the alleviation of suffering and the establishment of peace, and thus abiding a highly selective, and inconsistent, doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

This line of analysis suggests a reconvergence of authority and
effectiveness in relation to humanitarian claims as evaluated in context,
thereby reinforcing not only sovereign rights and norms of non-intervention, but also endorsing a limited option of humanitarian intervention.
Such an approach opens the way for humanitarian assistance in many,
but not all, circumstances, and recognizes that the actors in the current
phase of the Westphalian structure must often make tragic choices
between diplomacies of interventionism and reconciliation. In the absence of strong strategic interests on the part of major states, or the
existence of a mobilized domestic constituency that is pushing humanitarian concerns onto the foreign policy agenda in a manner that overcomes a purely geopolitical assessment of interests, only a diplomacy of
reconciliation remains viable.28

26. See Rumage, supra note 15.
27. Humanitarian interventions might become more feasible in a wider class of instances
if the United Nations or a regional actor were given the financial and peacekeeping resources
to act with far greater independence of geopolitical priorities. Reconceiving geopolitics to
incorporate acute humanitarian emergencies for the sake of overall global stability and
investor confidence could be viewed as another modus operandi. The essence of this point is
grasped by comparing the mobilization of resources to address the Iraqi challenge in the Gulf
crisis with that occurring in response to the Serb challenge in Bosnia.
28. As argued, such pressures can work for or against intervention, and in normative
terms, are a "wild card" played in specific circumstances.
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. In advocating such a position, it is obvious that major, and likely
unfortunate, uncertainties exist in relation to the adoption of a more
permissive approach to interventionary options. No one can answer the
"what if" questions about various recommended interventionary initiatives alleged to support humanitarian goals. Would an early NATO
action of bombing the gun emplacements around Sarajevo have lifted
the siege sooner and led to a quicker, less devastating "peace"? Or
would such action have led to a bloody Serbian retaliation against
vulnerable United Nations forces prompting their removal or to a spread
of the violence to new arenas in the Balkans? 29 Did the creation of the
safe havens negligently contribute to ethnic cleansing and the containment of refugees or was it a genuine good faith effort to provide sanctuary and protection for a portion of the entrapped Muslim population of
Bosnia? Clearly the inability to defend adequately several of the six safe
havens contributed to the impression of United Nations impotence and
responsibility, and probably suggested that had the level of Serb aggressiveness been anticipated, support for the safe haven concept would not
have been forthcoming. These fundamental issues are what postmodernists (in the deconstructionist mode) are fond of calling
"undecidables." The vigorous debates generated by them reveal little
about the probabilities and much about the sensibilities of participants in
the debate. 30
IV. MAKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION HUMANITARIAN

My argument has been that with the end of the Cold War there has
been a notable shift in interventionary diplomacy away from purely
geopolitical interventionism in the direction of support for humanitarian
claims to alleviate human suffering. This shift has been expressed
especially strongly in United States foreign policy, both as directly

29. The retrospective claims made in light of NATO bombs bringing the Serbs to Dayton
need to be tempered by the realization that their impact occurred after Milogevid had abandoned maximalist Serb goals in the war and after the military buildup of Croatia and Bosnia
changed the realities on the ground. Without a far more detailed analysis of causal responses

at various stages of the conflict it is exceedingly difficult to draw any firm conclusions about
what would have happened had bombing occurred sooner. What is clear is that the United
States and other actors undertaking such earlier bombing would have had to be bureaucratically prepared in advance to cope effectively with the political fallout arising from
possible failure of bombing to achieve its intended results and with possible Serb retaliatory
actions.
30. To some extent the deontologically minded are drawn to positions that seem intrinsically right, acting to oppose ethnic cleansing; while the consequentially minded are drawn to
positions that seem contextually sound, given likely effects of proposed actions. Some
combination of perspectives is probably most likely to produce results that are both responsi-

ble and responsive; the appropriate combination is impossible to codify in any useful way.
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enacted, and as channelled through the United Nations, and to some
extent, NATO.
From a purely normative perspective of law and morality, this shift
in interventionary practice is a welcome development. But it has foundered in key instances because it was based on a shallow commitment
of resources and will, underestimating the burdens associated with
carrying humanitarian diplomacy successfully to term. Earlier
geopolitical interventions had also frequently failed because they engendered a combination of indigenous, nationalist resistance and counterintervention organized by opposed geopolitical actors. Thus,
interventionary success cannot be equated talismanically with money,
weapons, or even ground forces.
Interventionary experience suggests a number of conclusions with
respect to humanitarian emergencies. First, the best opportunity, given
available levels of capability, to avoid acute suffering is normally for
states to become seriously engaged in a preventive role. Such a role can
include providing a symbolic presence, substantial economic relief, and
making constructive diplomatic intermediary services available to the
troubled states. Second, external encouragement of nationalist tendencies
toward self-determination needs to be balanced effectively by adequate
protection of human rights. 3' Third, once battlefield results have produced a stalemate or antagonists have reached a point of disillusionment
with armed struggle, outside diplomatic moves and military forces can
play a valuable catalytic role in encouraging and implementing a peace
process. Fourth, during the phases of most intense humanitarian emergency, in the absence of a suitable interventionary response by states
and international institutions, a maximal effort should be made to support transnational and grassroots initiatives - especially those with a
non-violent, reconciling orientation - without compromising their independence. Fifth, a critical geopolitics is needed to convince those who
dominate decisions over the allocation of resources, that investments in
conflict-prevention, human rights (including economic, social, and
cultural, as well as civil and political), and conflict-resolution are conducive to global stability and prosperity; whether such a critical geopolitics
is presented as "a new realism" or as an abandonment of realism is not

31. The German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 was in this sense antihumanitarian even if it did support strong majoritarian claims of self-determination. Ethnically

or religiously mobilized majorities pose severe human rights challenges to dissident minorities, especially as in Croatia and Bosnia, where varying interpretations of recent historical
experience engendered plausible fears and established political space for opportunistic
politicians to play their own minority nationalist card as Milogevid did to such devastating
effect in both Croatia and Bosnia.

Winter 1996]

The Complexities of HumanitarianIntervention

513

of great importance vis-a-vis altering the makeup of decisions and
understanding what counts for individual and collective well-being at
this stage of international political life.
It is the contention of this paper that these five directions of policy
have been insufficiently emphasized in the years since 1989. The consequence has been an unhealthy move from an initial unfounded enthusiasm for "humanitarian intervention" to a more recent unwarranted
disillusionment. As a result, even allowing for some specific successes
and mixed outcomes, the net impact of humanitarian diplomacy has
been perceived to be, and in several instances has been, anti-humanitarian. The challenge now is to rededicate our energies to increase the
prospect of humanitarian interventions serving humanitarian goals. Until
this can be done, the failure of humanitarian intervention since 1989 will
be generally interpreted as far outweighing the successes, and seem
likely to continue for the foreseeable future to produce a renewal of
support for the ethos of non-interventionism.

